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HOW MODERN TRENDS AND MARKET ECONOMICS
HAVE RENDERED ANTI-TICKET SCALPING
LEGISLATION OBSOLETE

INTRODUCTION

A search for "tickets" on eBay brings back 246,598 results.1 The
same search on StubHub brings back 34,230 results.2 Attend any major sporting event and you will likely encounter people outside the
venue that are both buying and selling tickets. These transactionsboth through the Internet and face-to-face-construct the secondary
ticket market,3 where scalpers resell tickets to sporting or entertainment events "at whatever price the market will bear."'4 Often, this
market price is above the ticket's face value, which creates benefits
and harms. The secondary ticket market harms some consumers by,
among other things, depriving them from acquiring tickets that they
could otherwise afford if prices were kept at face value. 5 But the secondary ticket market can benefit other consumers who were unable to
attain tickets initially at face value by providing them on the secondary ticket market.
In response to the harms caused by ticket scalping, many state legislatures have enacted anti-ticket scalping legislation. 6 Some states limit
who can resell tickets at above face value by requiring ticket brokers 7
1. eBay, http://ebay.com (last visited Aug. 31, 2009) (enter "tickets" into the "Find" field)
2. StubHub, http://www.stubhub.com (last visited Aug. 31, 2009) (enter "tickets" into the
"Search" field). StubHub is a leading ticket resale website.
3. This ticket market is "secondary" because the market involves the resale of tickets after the
reselling party has already made the initial purchase. See Jasmin Yang, Comment, A Whole
Different Ballgame: Ticket Scalping Legislation and Behavioral Economics?, 7 VAND. J. ENT.L.
& PRAC. 111, 111 (2004).
4. Id.
5. See Paul J. Criscuolo, Comment, Reassessing the Ticket Scalping Dispute: The Application,
Effects and Criticisms of Current Anti-Scalping Legislation, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 189, 198
(1995). "Congestion" around the venue, "harassment" of those attending the event, "misrepresentation of ticket prices," and "fraudulent sale of tickets" are also consumer harms imposed by
ticket scalping. Id. at 192.
6. Id. at 189.
7. In this Comment, the term "broker" refers to those who resell tickets within the boundaries
of the governing state statute, or those organizations and individuals whose purpose is to resell
tickets, although they might not be complying with statutory regulations. Even so, the term
"ticket scalping" is used to describe the act of reselling a ticket, whether the seller is a broker of
scalper.

698

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:697

to become properly 'registered 8 or to receive permission from the
venue owner. 9 Other states attempt to control ticket scalping by creating a buffer zone around the venue where the resale of tickets is
prohibited, 10 or by controlling the price at which a ticket can be resold." In general, these statutes aim to protect both consumers and

original ticket sellers from the harms that are created by ticket scalping.12 These aims are consistently cited by courts when they uphold
anti-ticket scalping legislation against claims that the legislation vio13
lates due process and equal protection.

Despite these statutes' attempts to regulate the secondary ticket
market, the market continues to grow. In addition to Internet resale
websites, professional sports teams and leagues have created their
4
own Internet websites to capitalize on the secondary ticket market.'
Indeed, ticket scalping has not been reduced by anti-ticket scalping
legislation.
This Comment argues that anti-ticket scalping statutes are unnecessary and should be repealed because the policies and purposes supporting the statutes have been undercut by both modern
developments in the ticket market and market economics. Part II of
this Comment examines several anti-ticket scalping statutes, grouping
them together according to the manner in which they attempt to control ticket scalping. 15 It also examines the purposes each group of

statutes aims to achieve'

6

and the various challenges to these stat-

8. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375/1.5(b)(1) (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-27(b) (West
Supp. 2009).
9. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-344 (1995).
10. See, e.g., ARM. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3718 (2001).
11. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-63-201 (2005); Wis. STAT. § 42.07 (2008).
12. See Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 189.
13. See People v. Patton, 309 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ill. 1974) (upholding the Illinois Ticket Scalping
Act against a due process challenge); see also State v. Leary, 587 A.2d 85, 89 (Conn. 1991)
(upholding a state anti-ticket scalping statute against an equal protection challenge).
14. The NFL teamed with TicketMaster prior to the 2008 season in order to create the NFL
Ticket Exchange, an NFL-sanctioned online secondary ticket market. See Michael McCarthy,
NFL's Online Ticket Exchange Kicks Off, USA TODAY, Aug. 7, 2008, at 12C. Ticket sellers will
be allowed to set their own price when they sell tickets on the website. Id. Individual teams
have also entered the secondary ticket markets (1) by accepting a flat fee from third-party vendors in exchange for allowing that vendor to be the preferred ticket reseller for that team, (2) by
receiving a percentage of all tickets sold on the secondary market by a preferred ticket reseller,
and (3) by setting up their own ticket exchange and collecting a percentage of all sales. See
Anthony J. Dreyer & Mitchell P. Schwartz, Whose Game Is It Anyway: Sport Teams' Right to
Restrict (and Control) Ticket Resale, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 753, 780-87
(2007).
15. See infra notes 26-55 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 56-76 and accompanying text.
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utes.17 Part III analyzes recent trends in both the primary and secondary ticket markets and how these trends undermine the purposes
behind the statutes. 18 Part III also demonstrates how an economic
analysis casts doubt on the necessity of regulating the secondary ticket
market. 19 Part IV examines the problems that would exist in an unregulated secondary ticket market and discusses proposed federal leg20
islation and other suggested solutions to those problems.
II.

BACKGROUND

To understand why ticket scalping statutes are unnecessary and ineffective, it is first important to understand the statutes themselves
and what they aim to do. Many states have sought to regulate the
resale of tickets. Section A discusses the anti-ticket scalping statutes
that exist in various states, classifying them according to their treatment of ticket scalping. 21 Section B then describes the purposes driving these statutes, namely, consumer welfare and the protection of
primary ticket sellers.22 Finally, Section C discusses constitutional
challenges that have been made to various statutes that regulate ticket
resale.
A.

CurrentAnti-Ticket Scalping Legislation

A majority of states have already enacted some type of legislation
to control ticket scalping. 23 While each statute is aimed at reducing or
17. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 99-171 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 175-192 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 197-231 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 25-55 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 56-76 and accompanying text.
23. Currently, twenty-eight states regulate the resale of tickets in some manner. ALA. CODE
§ 40-12-167 (2003); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3718 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-63-201
(2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 346 (West 1999); COL. REV. STAT. § 6-1-718 (2009); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53-289 (2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 918(a) (2007); FLA. STAT. § 817.36 (2008),
amended by 2009 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1446 (West); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4B-25 (2008); HAw.
REV. STAT. § 440-17 (1993); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375/1.5 (2008); IND. CODE § 25-9-1-26 (2004
& Supp. 2008); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 518.070 (LexisNexis 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:1
(2003 & Supp. 2009); MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 4-318 (LexisNexis 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 140, § 185A (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.465(2) (1981); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-23-97
(2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-27 (West Supp. 2009); N.M. STAT. § 30-46-1 (2004); N.Y. ARTS &
CULT. Ais. LAW § 25.11 (McKinney Supp. 2009) (effective until May 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-344 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 715.48 (LexisNexis 2008); 4 PA. STAT. ANN. § 202
(West 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-22-26 (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-710 (Supp. 2008); VA.
CODE ANN. § 15.2-969 (Supp. 2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 67.70.110 (2008); Wis. STAT § 42.07
(2008).
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controlling the resale of tickets, the statutes are not uniform in how
24
they achieve that goal.
1.

Permitting Sale Above Face Value by Certain Persons

Some states regulate ticket scalping by allowing individuals who
meet certain statutory requirements to resell tickets at above face
value. States do this by either allowing sellers to register as brokers or
by allowing sellers to solicit permission to sell at higher prices from
25
the owners or operators of the event venues.
A handful of states regulate ticket scalping by prohibiting the resale
of tickets at above face value unless the reseller becomes properly
registered. 26 Proper registration mandates that a broker meet certain
requirements. 27 In Illinois, for example, to become registered, the
broker must engage in the resale of tickets "on a regular and ongoing
basis from one or more permanent fixed locations." 28 Further, the
broker must implement several consumer protection requirements,
such as maintaining a toll-free number for consumer complaints,
adopting a refund policy, and establishing a $100,000 "consumer protection rebate fund" in the form of "cash available for immediate dis'2 9
bursement for satisfaction of valid consumer complaints.
Like Illinois, New Jersey and Alabama prohibit ticket brokers from
engaging in the resale of tickets unless they meet a list of requirements. 3 0 In New Jersey, a ticket seller must have a permanent location to sell tickets, obtain proper registration, and maintain records of
sales. 31 The seller must also make certain disclosures to buyers, such
as the location of the seats, the seller's guarantee policy, and the
seller's refund policy. 32 In Alabama, any ticker holder may resell the
ticket at above face value as long as the ticket holder pays a $100
33
license tax.
Illinois, New Jersey, and Alabama allow the resale of tickets at
above face value by properly licensed or registered ticket brokers.
Other states also allow the resale of tickets at above face value by only
24. See infra notes 25-55 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 26--37 and accompanying text.
26. See ALA. CODE § 40-12-167 (2005); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375/1.5 (2008); N.J.

§ 56:8-27 (West Supp. 2009); 4 PA.
27.
28.
29.
30.

STAT. ANN.

§ 202 (West 2008).

See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375/1.5(b)(1) (2008).
375/1.5(b)(1)(A).
375/1.5(b)(1)(F)(c-1)(iv).
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-27 (West Supp. 2009).

31. See § 56:8-27(a)-(b), (d).
32. See § 56:8-27(e)-(g).
33. ALA. CODE § 40-12-167 (2003).

STAT. ANN.
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those sellers that obtain permission from the event's promoter or the
venue's owner or operator. For example, North Carolina allows ticket
agents to add a reasonable service fee to each ticket's face value. This
fee cannot exceed $3, unless the agent has obtained written permission from the promoter or operator of the venue to charge a service
fee in excess of the statutory $3 limit. 34 The statute's exception to the

$3 maximum appears to be very limited because its language demands
that the written agreement between the agent and the promoter or
35
operator be executed prior to the ticket's initial sale.

California's statute also involves consent from the event promoter
or venue operator. Under the statute, a seller needs written permission from the owner or operator of the property in which the event is
to be held in order to resell the ticket at above face value while on
that property. 36 This requirement applies only to a ticket that "was
'37
obtained for the purpose of resale.
2.

Permitting Sales at Certain Distancesfrom the Venue

Some states restrict where tickets can be resold, as opposed to the
statutes described above, which deal solely with who can resell tickets.
For example, Arizona's statute prohibits the resale of a ticket for a
price above face value if the sale occurs within 200 feet of the event's
venue or in a conjoining parking structure. 38 Like California's statute,
Arizona's statute applies only to tickets that are purchased for the
39
purpose of resale.
Similarly, New York's statute prohibits the resale of tickets within a
certain distance from the venue, 40 but it is more far-reaching in two
respects. First, its restriction is much more expansive: for venues that
hold more than 5,000 people, tickets cannot be resold within 1,500 feet
of the physical venue; 4 1 for venues of 5,000 people or less, the distance
is reduced to 500 feet. 42 Additionally, New York's statute makes no
34. N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 14-344 (1995).

35. See id. The statute states that the initial ticket provider must inform the public of the
agreed-upon service fee by printing or writing the amount of the fee on the tickets. Id.

36. See
37. Id.

CAL. PENAL CODE

38. ARiz.

39.
40.
effect
41.

REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 346 (West 1999).
§ 13-3718 (2001).

Id.
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 25.11 (McKinney Supp. 2009). This statute went into
on July 18, 2007 and is in effect only until May 16, 2010.
Id.

42. Id.
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mention of resale price. In theory and in practice, 43 the resale of tickets at prices below face value can be punishable under the statute.
3.

Limitations on Ticket Resale Price

Another group of states prohibit the resale of tickets based on the
price that the reseller charges. These states-including Kentucky, Maryland, and Wisconsin-allow the resale of tickets to occur as long as

the resale price is not greater than the printed ticket price. These
states make no exception for sellers who are properly registered or
licensed, nor do they allow the ticket reseller to charge reasonable
44
service fees in addition to the printed price.
Similarly, Delaware does not allow ticket holders to "sell, resell or

exchange any ticket" at a price above face value. 45 Delaware adds a
unique wrinkle, however, by also governing when ticket scalping is
prohibited. Under the statute, those sales, re-sales, and exchanges are

prohibited if they occur the day of or the day before an event at one of
46
the statute's enumerated venues.
Other statutes also regulate ticket scalping by controlling price, but
they do so by allowing the seller to charge a certain amount above the
ticket price. Arkansas's statute strictly prohibits the resale of tickets
at a price above face value. 47 But the statute does allow the seller to

include a "reasonable charge for handling or credit card use" in addition to the printed price for tickets to a music event, although it is not
allowed for athletic events. 48 North Carolina's statute allows a seller
49
to add a maximum of a $3 service fee to the face value of each ticket,
while Florida's statute allows a seller to charge no more than the face

value plus

$1.50

43. In 2007, a ticket holder was issued a summons in New York for trying to sell a ticket for
$20 below the ticket's face value. Kate Hammer, Police Are Cracking Down on Ticket Sales
Outside Open, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2007, at D1, D3.
44. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 518.070 (LexisNexis 2008); see also MD. CODE ANN., Bus.
REG. § 4-318 (LexisNexis 2004); Wis. STAT. § 42.07 (2008).
45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 918(a) (2007). Delaware's statute is explicitly applied only to
events held at the sports and convocation center on the University of Delaware's campus, to
NASCAR races held at Dover Downs, or on any state or federal highway within the state. Id.
This statute is not as narrow as it might seem because Delaware has no major professional sports
teams.
46. Id.
47. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-63-201 (2005).
48. § 5-63-201(a)(1)(B).
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-344 (1995).
50. FLA. STAT. § 817.36 (2008)
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Internet Sales

Some states that restrict the online resale of tickets set up statutory
exemptions for Internet sellers who meet certain requirements. For
example, Illinois' statute allows the resale of tickets on a properly registered Internet auction listing service. 51 Similar to the requirements
laid out for face-to-face ticket brokers, these Internet auction listing
services must provide various consumer protection safeguards, including a refund policy and a dispute resolution procedure that gives resel52
lers and buyers the ability to file complaints against each other.
Pennsylvania structures its Internet sale exemption in a similar
way. 53 It prohibits the resale of tickets at a price above the printed
ticket price unless the seller has first obtained a license. 54 Similar to
Illinois's statute, Pennsylvania's statute exempts Internet ticket sellers
from the general prohibition of ticket resale as long as they meet similar consumer protection safeguards, including guaranteeing a refund
for tickets that are counterfeit or do not match the ticket's description
55
on the website.
B.

Purposes of Anti-Ticket Scalping Legislation

Ticket scalping legislation is driven by a variety of purposes and
goals. At their core, the statutes seek to ensure fairness. 56 This fairness has a dual meaning because it applies both to consumers who are
purchasing the tickets and to promoters who are initially selling the
tickets. 57 This Section first examines the statutory purpose of consumer protection by controlling ticket prices and eliminating nuisance,
fraud, and deceit. 58 This Section then explains the statutory purpose
of protecting the promoter by safeguarding the promoter's goodwill
and ensuring that others do not profit from the promoter's product at
59
the expense of the promoter.
Protecting the Consumer

1.

Proponents of anti-ticket scalping legislation point to several consumer protections that are furthered by the legislation. One goal of
51. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375/1.5(c) (2008).
52. See 1.5(c)(4)(B)-(c)(5).
53. 4 PA. STAT. ANN. § 202(c) (West 2008).

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See
See
See
See
See
See

§ 202(a).
§ 202(c).
Yang, supra note 4, at 120-21.
Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 196-99.
infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
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anti-ticket scalping statutes is to control the nuisance caused by those
who resell tickets in the area around the venue. 60 The traditional
ticket scalper resells tickets outside the venue, and therefore, proponents of the legislation argue that prohibiting the resale of tickets at
the venue reduces "congestion, annoyance and inconvenience. ' 6 1 The
statutes controlling a scalper's distance from the venue may reduce
the nuisance caused by ticket scalpers, as may statutes that grant
62
greater exemptions to Internet ticket sales.
Further, ticket scalping statutes serve as a protection against fraud
and deceit. 63 Proponents of the legislation argue that without the statutes, the ticket scalpers would sell counterfeit tickets or misrepresent
the quality of the tickets. 64 Thus, statutes that allow ticket brokers to
sell tickets if they meet certain consumer protection requirements are
aimed at reducing the fraud and deceit that may accompany ticket
scalping.
Anti-ticket scalping legislation also aims to serve consumers by
keeping ticket prices down, thus providing a greater number of consumers with access to tickets. This assumes that ticket scalpers participate in the "gouging of ticket prices ' 65 and that this is unfair because
the ticket's face price is its "fair" price. 66 According to one study,
consumers would prefer that tickets be sold to those who waited in
line the longest for the tickets, as opposed to those who were willing
to pay the most for the tickets. 67 Statutes that prohibit the resale of
tickets at prices above face value are aimed at achieving the goal of
reducing ticket price and maximizing ticket availability.
2.

Protecting the Promoter

In addition to protecting the consumer, scholars who support ticket
scalping statutes point to the protection that they provide to promoters-those who originally sell the tickets. 6 8 When deciding on a ticket
price, promoters may set the price at below market value as a demon60. See Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 198-99; see also Robert E. Freeman & Daniel Gati, Internet
Ticket Scalping, 21 ENT. & SPORTS L. 6, 6 (2003) (suggesting that ticket scalpers "create a negative atmosphere around the stadium").
61. Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 198.
62. Cf., e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375/1.5(c) (2009); 4 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 202 (2008).

63. See Sheree Rabe, Note, Ticket Scalping: Free Market Mirage, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 57, 62
(1991).
64. Id. at 59.
65. Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 199.
66. Yang, supra note 4, at 120.
67. Id. (citing Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A BehavioralApproach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1512 (1998)).
68. See Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 196-98.
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stration of "goodwill. '69 By doing this, the promoter is attempting to
offer his product to "ordinary fans."' 70 When scalpers raise prices on
resale, they are potentially ruining the promoters' goodwill because
tickets are now affordable to a smaller audience. 7 1 Although prices
on the secondary market are controlled by scalpers, consumers might
blame the promoters for the rise in tickets prices and refrain from
purchasing future tickets. 72 Proponents of anti-ticket scalping legislation argue that promoters may lose out on even more profit through a
reduction in sales of merchandise and other in-venue items such as
concessions 73 because those consumers that purchase tickets priced at
above face value might be less likely to spend money on in-venue
items.74 Therefore, statutes that control the price at which tickets may
be resold are targeted at protecting promoters' goodwill. Proponents
of the legislation also claim that ticket scalpers harm promoters by
75
making a profit that cannot be realized by the promoters themselves.
If there is a sudden jump in demand for a certain event, scalpers are
able to increase ticket prices and make a larger profit than the profit
made by the promoter. Proponents of anti-ticket scalping legislation
argue that this type of behavior prevents promoters from "tak[ing]
advantage of sudden rise in demand for such tickets .... [t]hereby
denying the promoters a full realization of the profit. ' 76 Thus, proponents of anti-ticket scalping legislation believe that the legislation protects promoters.
C.

Challenges to Anti-Ticket Scalping Legislation

These purposes of anti-ticket scalping legislation can all fit under
the umbrella of protecting public welfare. Courts have systematically
upheld these purposes as valid justifications for the statutes in the face
78
process challenges. 7 7 For example, courts in New Jersey, Illiof cd-.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 197-98.
Id. at 198.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 196.
Id.
Jonathan Bell, Ticket Scalping: Same Old Problem With a Brand New Twist, 18 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 435, 444-45 (2006). Bell states that since 1934 no challenge to anti-ticket scalping legislation has prevailed under a due process theory. Id. at 446. In 1934, the U.S. Supreme
Court held in Nebbia v. New York that any economic policy will be upheld as long as it is "reasonably deemed to promote public welfare" and is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.
291 U.S. 502, 516 (1934). This shift toward a deferential approach to state legislatures essentially
overruled a 1927 U.S. Supreme Court decision that struck down a New York statute that prohibited the resale of tickets for more than fifty cents over the face value. See Tyson v. Banton, 273

706
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nois, 79 and Tennessee 80 have all heard and rejected claims that antiticket scalping statutes violate the Due Process Clause. Courts have
also upheld anti-ticket scalping legislation against claims that it vio81
lates the Equal Protection Clause.
III.

ANALYSIS

An analysis of the ticket market and the recent shifts in the market
demonstrates that anti-ticket scalping statutes are not fulfilling their
intended purposes. This Part begins by examining the overall effect,
or lack thereof, that the statutes have had on the secondary ticket
market.8 2 It then discusses modern trends in the secondary ticket
market-namely, the movement of primary ticket sellers into the marU.S. 418, 433 (1927). It also shifted the Court away from the jurisprudence of the Lochner era,
which was characterized by a greater judicial willingness to strike down statutes that sought to
regulate individual rights in the name of the public interest. See Bell, supra, at 444.
78. See N.J. Ass'n of Ticket Brokers v. Ticketron, 543 A.2d 997 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1988). An association of ticket brokers challenged the constitutionality of a New Jersey antiticket scalping statute, citing Tyson to argue that the statute violated due process. Id. at 1001.
The court upheld the statute as a reasonable attempt to promote public welfare. Id. at 999.
79. See People v. Patton, 309 N.E.2d 572 (Ill. 1974). A defendant who was charged with violating the Illinois Ticket Scalping Act challenged it on due process grounds. Id. at 573. The
Illinois Supreme Court upheld the statute, citing Nebbia for the proposition that the statute was
constitutional because it had a reasonable relationship to a legitimate government interest, and it
was neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. Id. at 574-76.
80. See State v. Spann, 623 S.W.2d 272, 273 (Tenn. 1981). A defendant charged with violating
Tennessee's anti-ticket scalping statute challenged it on due process grounds. Id. The Tennessee
Supreme Court upheld the statute as a proper regulation of "health, safety, morals or welfare of
the public." Id.
81. See, e.g., State v. Leary, 587 A.2d 85, 90 (Conn. 1991). A Connecticut statute allowed an
event owner or operator to authorize any person to sell a ticket at a price above face value. Id.
at 86. A defendant who was prosecuted under the statute challenged it on equal protection
grounds, claiming that the statute granted a benefit to one group of individuals, while impermissibly denying it to another group of individuals. Id. at 87. The Connecticut Supreme Court
upheld the statute because it bore a "reasonable relationship to a proper legislative purpose in a
manner that is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory." Id. at 88. In upholding the statute, the
court rejected the argument that the statute allowed for ticket scalping to occur and exorbitant
prices to be charged in contravention of the statute's purpose to keep ticket prices down. Id. at
89. The court stated, "A more reasonable interpretation is that the legislature concluded that
since an owner is free to enter into contractual relations regarding the price of tickets for his own
pecuniary benefit, the exemption was appropriate, and that owners would not authorize others
to sell tickets at an unreasonable markup." Id. The statutes challenged on equal protection
grounds are those that carve out an exception to allow certain people, such as registered and
licensed ticket brokers, to resell tickets. Another example is State v. Youker, in which the Oregon Court of Appeals rejected an equal protection claim made against a statute that forbade
ticket scalping for events at public arenas, while allowing it for events at privately owned facilities. 585 P.2d 43, 44 (Or. Ct. App. 1978). The court found a rational basis for treating differently
the two types of facilities: the public finances the public arenas and deserves an opportunity to
purchase tickets at face value for events held there. Id. at 44.
82. See infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
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ket and the rise in primary ticket prices-and analyzes how these
trends undermine the purposes behind the anti-ticket scalping legislation.8 3 This Part concludes by analyzing how market economics are
frustrated by a secondary market that is heavily regulated by
84
legislation.
A.

Are the Statutes Working?

The secondary ticket market is a $5 billion industry with a forecasted annual growth rate of 12%.85 Ticketmaster, "the world's leading ticket company, '8 6 became involved in the secondary ticket
market by purchasing TicketsNow, a ticket resale website, for $265
million in early 2008.87 Its purchase came one year after eBay purchased secondary market giant StubHub for $310 million in 2007.88
StubHub, the nation's largest online ticket reseller,8 9 enjoyed $199
million in sales in 2006.90 Thus, the secondary market is massive; the
question is whether anti-ticket legislation effectively regulate this massive market.
The anti-ticket scalping statutes are having little effect on the faceto-face secondary ticket market. 9' Specifically, the statutes are difficult to enforce because they require added security measures to ensure that scalpers surrounding a stadium are caught. 92 Critics have
suggested that security forces would need to be at least doubled in
order to minimize ticket scalping that occurs outside venues prior to
events. 93 Further, some scalpers are finding loopholes in the current
83. See infra notes 101-171 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 175-193 and accompanying text.
85. Amy O'Brien, Fans Frustratedby Resellers After AC/DC Sells Out in Four Minutes, VANCOUVER SUN, Sept. 23, 2008, at Al.
86. Ticketmaster, Who We Are, http://www.ticketmaster.ca/h/whoweare.html (last visited Feb.
27, 2009).
87. Elise Young, CongressionalHearings Set on Ticketmaster Merger; Examination Follows
Outcry over Springsteen Sales, BERGEN REC., Feb. 19, 2008, at A4.
88. O'Brien, supra note 85.
89. See Keith O'Brien, Two Super Bowl Tickets, $77,000: Fans Send Prices Soaring in HighProfile Matchup, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 30, 2008, at Al, A12.
90. Drew Armstrong, The Hottest Companies on This Year's Inc. 500, INc. MAG., Oct. 1, 2006,
available at http://www.inc.comlmagazine/20061001/priority-inc5OO.html (last visited Nov. 24,
2009).
91. See Jonathan C. Benitah, Anti-Scalping Laws: Should They Be Forgotten?, 6 TEX. REV.
ENr. & SPORTS L. 55, 67-69 (2005). Benitah also argues that anti-ticket scalping statutes are
unconstitutional. Id. at 61-67. He suggests alternative regulations that would confine scalpers to
certain areas around the venue in order to reduce the nuisance. Id. at 77.
92. See Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 214-15.
93. Id. at 215.
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anti-ticket scalping legislation by charging high fees in addition to the

95
printed ticket price 94 or by packaging the ticket with other items.
As lawmakers began to recognize that anti-ticket scalping statutes
were not having their intended effect, they began adjusting or repealing their state's statutes. For example, Missouri does not allow any
city, county, or political subdivision to enact an ordinance that would
"prohibit the sale or resale of an admission ticket to any legal event at
any price or prohibit the charging of any fee in connection with such

sale or resale," although ticket scalpers can still be criminally punished
96
for "fraud, false advertising, or other deceptive business practices.
As of 2007, forty-seven states either allowed ticket scalping in some

97
manner or were in discussions about deregulating ticket scalping.

Among these are the states described above that allow the resale of
tickets by registered brokers and those that allow resales a certain dis98
tance from the venue.

B. Modern Trends in the Secondary and Primary Ticket Markets

Two overarching trends exist in the ticket markets: the entrance of
primary ticket sellers into the secondary ticket market, 99 and the increase in primary ticket prices. 10 0 This Section discusses these two

trends.
1.

Primary Ticket Sellers Entering the Secondary Ticket Market
Initially, primary ticket sellers were opposed to the resale of their

tickets on the secondary Internet market.101 But with a multi-billion
dollar market sitting right in front of them, professional sports leagues
and teams chose not to sit around idly while the secondary ticket market raked in money. Instead, the leagues and teams entered the sec94. Id.
95. See Benitah, supra note 91, at 68.
96. Mo. REv. STAT. § 67.306 (2007).
97. Heather Collura, Move on to Deregulate Ticket Resale, USA TODAY, July 5, 2007, at 12C.
When Collura says that forty-seven states are deregulated or are considering becoming deregulated, it seems that her definition of "deregulated" includes statutory exceptions for Internet
sales and registered ticket brokers, among others. See id. The shift, therefore, is not as pronounced as it might seem, because all of the state statutes previously discussed offer some way in
which a party can legally resell a ticket.
98. See ALA. CODE § 40-12-167 (2003); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3718 (2001); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 375/1.5 (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-27 (West 2001).
99. See infra notes 101-114 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 115-122 and accompanying text.
101. See NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., No. 064874BLS1, 2007 WL 2367748, at *1 (Mass. Super.
Ct. July 31, 2007), in which the NFL's New England Patriots brought suit against StubHub for
the unlicensed resale of tickets.
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ondary ticket market in order to capitalize on the profits.10 2 The
National Football League (NFL) partnered with Ticketmaster prior to
the 2008 season to create the NFL Ticket Exchange, a league-sponsored secondary ticket marketplace that complies with the applicable
anti-ticket scalping laws.10 3 The partnership aimed to capitalize on an
already strong secondary ticket market-an estimated 1.1 to 2.2 million NFL tickets were sold on the secondary ticket market in 2007.104

Fans are now able to set their own prices and sell tickets to all NFL
games.
Professional sports teams are also forming ticket exchange websites
to capitalize on Internet ticket sales. TicketMaster, which operates
the NFL's Ticket Exchange, operates similar exchanges for eight NFL
teams, twenty National Hockey League (NHL) teams, and twenty National Basketball Association (NBA) teams. 10 5 Teams have also attempted to capitalize on secondary ticket sales by forming sponsorship
agreements with various secondary ticket websites. 10 6 Under this
practice, a team receives a flat fee from the ticket reseller, and the
ticket reseller is granted some type of exclusive access to that team's
secondary ticket market.10 7 For example, the NFL's Chicago Bears
have an agreement with StubHub, under which StubHub pays the
Bears a flat fee in exchange for receiving "exclusive access" to the
Bears' website and permission to use the Bears' logo. 10 8 Other teams
provide advertising space to ticket resellers in exchange for a fee. 10 9
Primary ticket sellers also profit on the secondary ticket market
through "percentage fee agreement(s)"' 1 0 instead of flat-fee arrangements. StubHub makes a profit by forcing buyers to pay a 10% fee
and charging sellers a 15% commission on sales.1 1' MLB formed an
agreement with StubHub in 2007, authorizing StubHub as its exclusive
102. See Dreyer & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 780.
103. See McCarthy, supra note 14.
104. Id.
105. See Ticketmaster, Browse by Team, http://teamexchange.ticketmaster.com/html/tmthome.html?l=EN (last visited on Nov. 16, 2009) (listing the teams that participate in the Ticket
Exchange).
106. Dreyer & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 780-86.
107. Id. at 781.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 782. The NFL's Jacksonville Jaguars have a deal with TicketsNow, a ticket
resale website, that provides the site with access to radio, television, and in-stadium advertising.
Id.
110. Id. at 782-83.
111. Rachel Konrad, StubHub, MLB Enter Ticket Resale Pact, USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2007-08-02-2406372049_x.htm.
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ticket reseller. 112 As part of the deal, StubHub shares with MLB 25%
113
of the profit that is gained from ticket resales.
In sum, the migration of primary ticket sellers into the secondary
market has opened up new avenues to resell tickets, contributing to a
secondary market that produces between $4 and $10 billion in overall
sales.' 14
2.

Rise in Primary Ticket Prices

In addition to getting involved in the secondary ticket market, primary ticket sellers are also raising prices in the primary ticket market.
In essence, the secondary ticket market has allowed promoters to realize the high demand for their tickets, and, in turn, raise ticket prices.
Some promoters accomplish this by enacting an across-the-board
price hike in response to higher resale prices on tickets for previous
events. 115 Other promoters will vary their prices based on the expected demand for various events. For example, the NBA's Utah Jazz
implemented such a "variable pricing" policy prior to the 2008-2009
season. 116 Under this policy, the team studied its secondary ticket exchange website to determine what games were most popular among
ticket buyers, and it then raised face values for ten of the team's fortyone home games. 117 The NFL's New York Jets have also increased
prices by taking advantage of the Internet's secondary ticket market.
In anticipation of the opening of its new stadium in 2010, the Jets used
Stubhub to auction off 620 top-tier seat licenses in the stadium.1 18 A
seat license gives the holder the right to buy tickets. 119 The bidding
enabled the team to take advantage of the online market and allowed
it to determine the true market value of tickets. 120 On average, pri112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Keith Reed, PatriotsSue Ticket Reseller in Effort to Fight Scalping, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
23, 2006, at Al, A28.
115. See Virginia Rohan & Eunnie Park, A Ticket to Scalp; How Sellers Use Internet to Drive
Up Prices, BERGEN RECORD, Dec. 30, 2007, at Al.

116. Michael C. Lewis, NBA & Jazz: Expect Higher Ticket Prices for Higher Profile Games,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 28, 2008.

117. Id. In addition to using its secondary ticket exchange website to pick specific games for
which to raise prices, the team also relied on the secondary ticket market when making its overall decision to raise primary prices. Id. The team's senior vice president of sales and marketing
said, "There is a secondary ticket market out there, where people are paying increased prices for
specific games. We felt that we could capitalize on this opportunity and capitalize on the demand for these tickets, and generate some additional revenue." Id.
118. Jets Cheer Online Sale of Seat Licenses; Bidders Ante Up $16 Million Just for the Rights to
Buy Tickets, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 29, 2008, at S6.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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mary ticket prices have been rising in all four major sports leagues in
the United States, 12' as exemplified by the conduct of the Utah Jazz
and the New York Jets. The increase in professional sports ticket
prices is highlighted by the 2009 Super Bowl: for the first time in history, the face value for a Super Bowl ticket was $1,000.122
C.

Effects of the Modern Trends on the Statutes' Purposes

These trends-primary ticket sellers entering the market via secondary ticket exchanges and the rise of primary ticket prices-weaken

the purposes behind anti-ticket scalping legislation in two ways. First,
they devalue the protections the statutes give to the consumer,
namely, lower ticket prices and the minimization of fraud and nuisance. 12 3 Second, they undercut the protections that the statutes give
124
to the promoter, namely, protecting his goodwill and profits.
1.

Protecting the Consumer

Current trends in the sale and resale of tickets are undermining the
protections meant for consumers because the statutes do not lower
ticket prices or reduce nuisance and fraud. One justification of antiticket scalping legislation is that it keeps ticket prices down for consumers. 125 As demand for an event rises, tickets are scalped at "exces-

sive market prices.

' 126

In an open market, "[a] disproportionate

number of tickets for each event . . . are purchased by professional
scalpers with the sole intention of making a profit from the resale of
tickets."'12 7 Legislation aimed at keeping ticket prices down should

indeed keep prices down. But by analyzing primary ticket prices, it is
easy to see that this has not been the case-there exists a clear trend
of primary ticket sellers elevating face values for tickets. 28 However,
121. Nancy Armour, Fans Getting a Break As Economy Sours, PRESS REG., Oct. 26, 2008, at
2C. For the past decade, prices have risen in all four leagues. As of 2008, the average National
Football League ticket price was $72.20, the average National Basketball Association ticket price
was $48.83, the average National Hockey League ticket price was $49.66, and the average Major
League Baseball ticket price was $25.43. Id.
122. Ira Kaufman, That Super Bowl Seat May Cost You $1,000, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 16, 2008, at
1.
123. See infra notes 125-161 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 162-171 and accompanying text.
125. See Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 198-200. The legislative purpose of keeping ticket prices
down can also be inferred from the state statutes of Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Wisconsin. These states prohibit ticket scalping if the ticket is sold at a price above its face value. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 918(a) (2007); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 518.070 (West 2008); MD.

CODE ANN. Bus. REG. § 4-318 (LexisNexis 2004); WIs. STAT. § 42.07 (1993).
126. Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 196; accord Rabe, supra note 63, at 60.
127. Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 192.
128. See Armour, supra note 121; Lewis, supra note 116.
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a direct increase in primary ticket prices is not the most telling factor
to analyze whether the statutes are achieving their goals. This is the
case because a price increase could be unrelated1 29to ticket scalping and
not reflective of the legislation's effectiveness.
A more relevant factor is the entry of sports teams, 130 third party
facilitators, 3 1 and ticket brokers 132 into the secondary ticket market.
Sports teams have entered the secondary market by setting up their
own secondary ticket websites 133 and by partnering with existing secondary ticket websites.13 4 These websites are one avenue for independent sellers to enter the secondary ticket market. Another avenue is
through third-party facilitator sites such as Stubhub. Many of the professional sports teams' websites operate in this way, providing ticket
holders and ticket seekers with an online marketplace where sellers
and buyers converge. 135 Ticket brokers have also emerged as a viable
option for those who seek tickets. An estimated 800-1,000 ticket brokers exist in the United States, and brokers sell an estimated 10% to
136
30% of primary tickets.
These resale options, established by primary ticket sellers, create a
secondary market that is full of opportunities for consumers to buy
and sell tickets. These developments have an impact on ticket prices.
In addition to a rise in primary ticket prices, the prominence of the
secondary ticket market has also undermined anti-ticket scalping legislation's purpose of keeping prices down.
First, these providers of secondary ticket opportunities theoretically
have no price ceiling. StubHub and Ticket Exchange, the websites
used by many professional sports teams,1 37 allow the seller to set the
129. Even though a price hike that is imposed by primary ticket sellers runs contrary to the
statutory goal of keeping prices down, a price hike could be unrelated to ticket scalping.
Whether ticket scalping statutes are strict, lax, or nonexistent, a primary ticket seller may raise
prices in order to keep up with higher costs due to inflation or raise more revenue that will fund
a venue expansion or an increased team payroll, among other reasons.
130. See Dreyer & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 780-87; see McCarthy, supra note 14, at 12C.
131. See Stephen K. Happel & Marianne M. Jennings, Creating a Futures Market for Major
Event Tickets: Problems and Prospects, 21 CATO J. 443, 450 (2008) ("Buyers in the secondary
market are not going to brokers online. Instead they are headed to auction sites.").
132. See id. at 449-50.
133. See TicketMaster, supra note 105 and corresponding text.
134. See Dreyer & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 780-82.
135. See Ticketmaster, About TicketExchange, http://www.ticketmaster.com/h/te/about.html
#Q1 (last visited Feb. 27, 2009); StubHub, Welcome to StubHub, http://www.stubhub.com/aboutus (last visited Feb. 27, 2009) ("[Ejnabling fans to buy and sell tickets to tens and thousands of
sports, concert, theater and other live entertainment events.").
136. See Happel & Jennings, supra note 131, at 449. The 10% to 30% estimate is based on
two different estimates. The first estimate put the total amount of primary tickets sold by ticket
brokers at 10%, while the other estimate assumed it was closer to 20% to 30%. Id.
137. Ticketmaster, supra note 105.
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price of the tickets. 138 Additionally, nothing is preventing ticket brokers from setting similarly high prices. The only limitation on price is
what the market will bear. It is unlikely that a rational ticket broker
or independent seller will post a price that it feels is well above what
the market will pay. But statistics show that even with market demand providing some form of a price ceiling on the resale of tickets,
prices in the secondary market are substantially higher than face
value. In the middle of the 2008 season, the average ticket price on
Stubhub for twenty-two of thirty Major League Baseball teams was at
least double the average face value of tickets for those teams.' 39 Of
the remaining eight teams, all eight had an average ticket price on
StubHub that was at least $10 greater than the ticket's average face
140
value.
Further, various anti-ticket scalping statutes are either not focused
on imposing or are unable to impose maximum price limitations. For
example, both Illinois and New Jersey have statutes that allow ticket
brokers to become properly registered, 14 1 and neither statute mentions any price limitations on the brokers. 142 Even the states that prohibit the resale of tickets at specific prices might struggle to effectively
control resale price because of enforcement issues related to face-toface 143 and Internet sales. 144 To control face-to-face scalping, a state
would need to take security measures, which necessarily entails higher
costs. As one commentator noted,
Most states lack the money necessary to adequately police and prosecute scalping offenders .... Security forces, in order to minimize
ticket scalping, must be more than doubled on the nights of performances. Therefore, to significantly reduce scalping problems, a
138. StubHub's method for sellers is, "List your tickets for sale. You set the price." StubHub,
http://www.stubhub.com/how-stubhub-works/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2009). TicketExchange's policy is similar, telling a seller to enter "the posting price you designate." Ticketmaster, TicketExchange, http://www.ticketmaster.com/ticketexchange/selling/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
139. See Average MLB Ticket Sale Prices on StubHub down 2.9%, SPORTS Bus. DAILY, July
10, 2008, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/122251 (listing the 2008 average ticket price
on Stubhub.com for each Major League Baseball team through July 10, 2008); see also Major
League Baseball Average Ticket Prices, BOSTON, Mar. 28, 2008, http://www.boston.com/sports/
baseball/articles/2008/03/28/average-ticket-pricelist/ (listing the 2008 average face value ticket
price for each Major League Baseball team).
140. See Average MLB Ticket Sale Prices on StubHub down 2.9%, supra note 139; see also
Major League Baseball Average Ticket Prices, supra note 139.
141. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375/1.5 (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-27 (West 2001).
142. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375/1.5; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-27.

143. See Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 214-15.
144. See Daniel J. Glantz, Note, For-Bid Scalping Online? Anti-Ticket Scalping Legislation in
an Internet Society, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & Errr. L.J. 261, 286-87 (2005).
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greater number of security would be required, thus creating a bur14 5
den most state's [sic] simply cannot afford.

Enforcing anti-ticket scalping statutes on Internet sellers is also difficult. 146 One problem is jurisdiction: a seller can live in one state, a

consumer can live in another state, and the event can take place in a
third state. 147 A second problem is that Internet sales involve anonymous buyers and sellers. These two problems make enforcement
costly relative to the fine imposed by prosecution. 148 A third problem

related to the regulation of Internet ticket sales is the heavy involvement of primary ticket sellers in the secondary Internet market. This
involvement means that many sports teams and venue operators will
simultaneously be looking for protection from face-to-face scalping
outside their venues while also promoting Internet resales between its
ticket holders and secondary market consumers. 149 The hope held by

primary ticket sellers-that scalping be eliminated in some places and
not others-means that "anti-ticket scalping legislation must now
overcome a presumption that selective enforcement of the law has oc-

curred.1150 Thus, anti-ticket scalping statutes do little to protect con15
sumers and control ticket price. '
Another consumer protection policy associated with anti-ticket
scalping legislation is the reduction or elimination of "congestion, annoyance and inconvenience in areas where crowds must move rapidly
145. Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 214-15. Criscuolo discusses and dismisses private enforcement as a possible remedy for insufficient government enforcement of anti-ticket scalping legislation. Id. at 218. Under the proposed remedy, consumers who purchase tickets from the
scalper can sue to receive the difference between the scalped price and the face value of the
ticket, plus some punitive damages. Id.
146. See Glantz, supra note 144, at 286-87.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 287.
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. While anti-ticket scalping legislation might struggle to control ticket price, it does not
necessarily mean that ticket prices are "out of control." A quick search of any third-party
facilitator or Internet ticket broker would probably bring up reasonable-and even below face
value-ticket prices. During the 2008-2009 season, the lowest face value ticket price for a Chicago Bulls home game was $10. Buls.com, Ticket & Arena Info, http://www.nba.comlbullsl
tickets/index.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2009). The lowest ticket price on StubHub for each remaining home game in the Bulls 2008-2009 season ranged from $5 to $30. StubHub, Chicago
Bulls Tickets, http://www.stubhub.com/chicago-bulls-tickets/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2009). Reasonable and below value secondary market prices are not constrained to the NBA: the NHL's Chicago Blackhawks offered a $15 ticket as its cheapest individual home game price. Chicago
Blackhawks, Tickets, http://blackhawks.nhl.com/tickets/seatingandpricing.htm (last visited Feb.
26, 2009). On StubHub, the cheapest price for the team's remaining home games ranged from $8
to $18. StubHub, Chicago BlackHawks Tickets, http://www.stubhub.com/chicago-blackhawkstickets/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
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and safely. ' 152 Collectively, this can be considered an attempt at eliminating the nuisance caused by ticket scalping. Assuming that scalping
is truly a nuisance, 153 one must analyze whether the nuisance created
by ticket scalpers has been reduced or eliminated, and if so, whether
the statutes are the cause. While it is difficult to measure face-to-face
ticket scalping before and after the inception of anti-ticket scalping
legislation, analyzing other avenues for ticket scalping can shed some
light on the amount of ticket scalping that occurs outside a venue. As
previously discussed, ticket scalping by way of the Internet is growing,
both through team-supported websites and third-party auction sites.
For example, from its inception in 2000 to 2006, StubHub sold approximately five million tickets.1 54 The company reached ten million tickets sold less than one year later. 155 And just seven months after that,
the company had sold a total of fifteen million tickets. 156 Stubhub's
Internet growth seems to be the rule, not the exception, for primary
ticket sellers. Ticketmaster, a leading primary ticket seller, has seen
its sales shift away from walk-up and face-to-face sales and toward the
Internet. In 1996, the number of Ticketmaster tickets sold online in
relation to "traditional retail and telesales channels" was .1%. 157 By
the second quarter of 2000, that number had risen to 24.8%. 158 This
evidence shows that the world's largest primary 159 and secondary
ticket sellers' 60 are seeing their Internet sales skyrocket.
So what does this mean? Tickets to events are limited. An increase
in ticket sales through one avenue implies a decrease in ticket sales
through another. With an increase in online sales-both in the primary and secondary market-it is reasonable to assume that fewer
primary tickets are being purchased at the venues, and that fewer tickets are being scalped outside the venues. This theory is supported by
other commentators: "Instead of the stereotypical ticket scalper hold152. See Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 198.
153. This Comment argues that while everyone who has attended a professional sports event
would acknowledge the presence of scalpers surrounding the venue, not everyone would consider their presence to be especially annoying, inconvenient, or the cause of congestion. But
courts have held that any statutory purpose that is reasonably related to public welfare is appropriate, and courts have consistently upheld anti-ticket scalping statutes. See Bell, supra note 77,
at 444-46.
154. Press Release, Stubhub, StubHub's 15 Millionth Ticket Is Sold! (Aug. 1, 2008), available
at http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS130668+01-Aug-2008+MW20080801.
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. Happel & Jennings, supra note 136, at 450.
158. Id.
159. Tickets News, Top Primary Ticket Sellers, http://www.ticketnews.com/view/TopPrimary
Sellers (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
160. Id.
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ing an abundance of tickets above his or her head risking arrest in
order to make a profit, most ticket scalping occurs behind the scenes,
on Internet auction sites or through registered ticket brokers."'1 6 1
While the nuisance has been reduced, the cause behind the reduction
does not support the continued use of anti-ticket scalping statutes. In
sum, the reasons for the decrease in the nuisance associated with faceto-face ticket scalping can reasonably be attributed to the shift in
where ticket scalping occurs, not in some overall decrease in ticket
scalping caused by the legislation.
2.

Protecting the Promoter

One of the goals of anti-ticket scalping legislation is to protect promoters, both by protecting their goodwill and by preventing others
from unfairly appropriating the promoter's profit. 162 But the increased involvement of professional sports teams and leagues in the
secondary ticket market mitigates the need for these protections. By
offering ticket holders an extra avenue to resell tickets, the promoters
themselves are contributing to and participating in ticket scalping.
Ticket scalping involves the resale of tickets at prices above face value
to those who are willing to pay. The promoter is no longer an innocent bystander nor an unfortunate scapegoat for skyrocketing ticket
prices. By participating in the resale of tickets, the promoters weaken
their own argument-and the statute's purpose-that they wish to
keep ticket prices low for the protection of their goodwill.
In addition to protecting a promoter's goodwill, anti-ticket scalping
legislation is meant to ensure that only the promoter profits from
ticket sales to the event. 163 Prior to the shift in the secondary ticket
market, promoters were unable to take advantage of increased demand in the form of higher ticket sales. 64 Instead, scalpers were the
ones benefiting from the higher demand. 165 But now that promoters
are heavily involved in the secondary market, they are no longer
handicapped when it comes to reaping the benefits of increased demand. The promoter can now receive a portion of the ticket resale
price if it is sold above face value. 166
161. Bell, supra note 77, at 457.
162. Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 196-98
163. Id. at 196.
164. Id. at 196.
165. Id.
166. Promoters receive a percentage of the ticket resale price in a variety of ways already
discussed, including through resale agreements with Ticketmaster or percentage fee agreements
with other websites. See Ticketmaster, supra note 105; see also Dreyer & Schwartz, supra note
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Moreover, promoters are better off in an unregulated secondary
ticket marker when demand decreases for two reasons. First, an open
online ticket market allows the promoter to profit twice: once in the
primary market on the original ticket sale and again in the secondary
market on the percentage fee it charges on the ticket resale. The promoter's resale profit even goes beyond that made by a traditional
scalper, because unlike a traditional scalper, a promoter can profit
even when demand decreases. Suppose an original ticket sells for $50,
but the downward shift in demand puts the secondary market price at
$40. Suppose further that the promoter charges a 10% fee on ticket
exchange resales. A rational ticket holder wishing to sell his ticket
will sell it at a loss, as opposed to "eating" the ticket and taking a
complete loss. The promoter would receive $50 on the original sale
and $4 on the resale (10% of resale), for a total of $54. The scalper
would receive $36 (90% of the resale price) for a net loss of $14.
Here, entry into the secondary ticket market benefits the promoter in
the form of an extra $4.
Second, the structure of the online secondary market can help increase attendance at events with lower demand, compared to similar
events where no secondary ticket market exists. Because promoters
set ticket prices prior to the event, consumers who buy tickets ahead
of time take a risk that the event may be turn out to be a disappointment. 167 Presumably, some consumers do not take this risk, choosing
instead to wait and see if the event will be worthwhile. With ticket
scalpers in place, tickets are scooped up and then resold. When demand decreases, consumers who declined to purchase primary tickets
at face value may decide to buy at a reduced rate. When compared to
the alternative of those consumers staying at home, the promoter is
again benefited by scalpers.
Consider another simple example: suppose a promoter sells 100
tickets at a price of $20 each for a football game that will be played in
two months. If there is no secondary ticket market, 70 of those tickets
might be sold immediately to fans who expect demand to stay the
same, while 15 tickets will be purchased by fans who predict a demand
increase and want to ensure a ticket before that occurs, and the remaining 15 tickets will go unsold because consumers are wary that the
game will not be an attractive event in two months. Suppose that the
game loses its appeal, and no more tickets are sold. The promoter has
14, at 782-83 (discussing the percentage fee agreements that several teams have entered into
with third parties).
167. Posting of Phil Miller to Market Power, http://marketpower.typepad.com/market-power/
2007/08/ticket-scalping.html Aug. 1, 2007, 10:02 A.M.
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sold 85 tickets and will have 85 consumers attend the game, for a total
of $1,700 in addition to in-venue purchases. 68 Now suppose the same
scenario occurs in a world with a strong secondary ticket market. Presumably, there will be a slight drop in the number of fans who immediately buy tickets.' 69 So instead of an initial sale of 70 tickets, only 65
tickets are sold to fans who expect demand to stay constant. The same
15 tickets will be purchased by consumers who want to ensure a ticket
before demand increases. Ticket brokers and other scalpers snatch up
15 of the remaining 20 tickets, taking the risk that demand might decrease while hoping that they will profit if demand increases. The promoter has sold 95 tickets, for a total of $1,900. Suppose again that
demand decreases. The 5 unsold tickets remain unsold, but the brokers and scalpers are able to sell 10 of their 15 tickets at a price below
face value. As a result, 90 consumers attend the game-80 primary
consumers and the 10 consumers that purchased tickets from brokers
or scalpers. 170 In comparing the two scenarios in which demand decreases-one in a world with no secondary market and one in a world
with such a market-a promoter sold more tickets and had more consumers attend the event in a world in which ticket scalping is allowed.
The preceding example presumed that when a secondary ticket
market exists, rational consumers might purchase fewer primary tickets because they would be aware that they can acquire tickets at a
later date in the secondary ticket market. But this is not necessarily
true; perhaps an expanded secondary ticket market could generate
greater primary ticket sales. As the secondary ticket market grows, so
does the opportunity for a ticket holder to resell his ticket. With this
opportunity could come a greater likelihood that consumers will
purchase tickets from the promoter because they are ensured of recouping some or all the original ticket price if they cannot attend the
event, or if they lose interest. 171 In sum, the availability of a secondary ticket market might reduce primary ticket sales, but conversely,
its availability could be a primary reason that consumers purchase
more tickets from primary sellers.
168. This presumes that every person who purchased a ticket will attend the event even after
demand decreases. This is probably not the case, in reality, but it will be presumed for the
purpose of the example.
169. A rational fan might want to delay purchasing a ticket for reasons other than to see what
happens to demand. Perhaps the fan is worried about a conflict between the ticketed event and
another event, or would rather put the money toward another purchase at that time. The opportunity to purchase a ticket later in the secondary market allows a fan to delay purchase for these
reasons.
170. Once again, this presumes that every purchaser of a ticket will attend the event.
171. See Joe Nocera, Internet Puts a Sugarcoat on Scalping, N.Y. TiMs, Jan. 19, 2008, at C1,
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D.

Effect of Economics on Statutory Purposes

The modern trends in ticket sales and ticket scalping are not the
only factors that undercut the purposes driving anti-ticket scalping
legislation. Market economics does so as well. This Section first examines ticket prices under a simple supply and demand analysis, and
172
then turns its focus to the demand-based risks that promoters take.
This Section then analyzes barriers to entry created by some of the
anti-ticket scalping statutes.1 73 Finally, this Section contemplates how
a free market can and actually does foster at least one goal meant to
174
be achieved by ticket regulation, namely, lower prices.
1.

Market Economics

Opponents of anti-ticket scalping legislation argue that the legisla75
tion "interferes with the supply and demand of the free market.'
An increased demand coupled with a fixed supply should generally
lead to increased prices. Since it is impossible for ticket supply to increase endlessly in order to match an increase in demand, ticket prices
should rise when demand rises. But some anti-ticket scalping statutes
do not allow price increases when demand increases. This artificially
regulates ticket prices and usurps the price setting mechanism that
free-market economics naturally has in place. This mechanism "ensures that those consumers who want a scarce commodity most will
receive it."' 176 The price mechanism theory explains how prices are set
in the secondary market for most products, but it is overridden in the
secondary market for ticket sales because of concerns for consumer
and promoter welfare. As one scholar noted,
There are countless products that are perfectly legal to resell at top
market value such as art, antiques, and sports collectibles. None of
these items have any prohibition on their resale, even though a
"true fan" of Pablo Picasso or Babe Ruth177will never be able to acquire anything with their signature on it.
Anti-ticket scalping statutes are aimed at protecting promoters'
goodwill' 78 and denying scalpers the ability to profit from the highly
172. See infra notes 175-183 and accompanying text.
173. See infra notes 184-191 and accompanying text.
174. See infra notes 192-193 and accompanying text.
175. Rabe, supra note 63, at 63.
176. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 297
(11th ed. 2009).
177. Benitah, supra note 91, at 69-70.
178. Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 197-98. A promoter might set a lower price than the market
would allow because he wants consumers to spend more money once inside the venue. Id. The
promoter might also set a lower ticket price in order to make tickets available to the largest
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demanded seats. 179 But it is the promoters' own policy of setting
ticket prices in advance that prevents them from being able to profit
from an increase in demand. 180 A promoter has several reasons to set
prices in advance of events. For example, long lines may develop if a
promoter made tickets available only immediately prior to the
event. 181 The early sale of tickets can also protect a promoter from
reduced sales that occur when consumers lose interest in the event.1 82
If the event is a sports game, fans will lose interest if the teams are
performing poorly. If the event is an entertainment act, there is a risk
that the audience will lose interest because, as one commentator put
it, "performers go quickly from being 'in' to being 'out.' ' 183 Selling
tickets before the event date allows promoters to protect themselves
from a potential decrease in demand. Thus, promoters are unable to
profit from a sudden rise in demand because they chose to protect
themselves from a sudden decrease in demand. But one of the purposes driving anti-ticket scalping legislation is to protect promoters by
preventing others from appropriating the promoter's profits when demand increases. Therefore, the statutes provide too much protection
for promoters because it is the promoters' own policies protecting
against demand decrease that give scalpers the ability to resell tickets
for profit.
2.

Barriers to Entry

Anti-ticket ,scalping legislation in several states may also be creating
statutorily imposed barriers to entry in the ticket brokerage market.
Some states that permit the resale of tickets have enacted statutes
with requirements to become a licensed ticket broker;1 84 some of the
requirements create reasonably low barriers to entry into the secondary ticket market. New Jersey, for example, requires that a ticket
broker have a permanent location to sell tickets, obtain a proper registration, maintain records of sales, and disclose to the buyer the location of the seats, the seller's guarantee policy, and the seller's refund
number of people as possible. Scalping "deprives individuals, unable to afford the scalpers' premiums, from attending the event." Id. at 192.
179. Id. at 196.
180. Id.
181. See Stephen K. Happel & Marianne M. Jennings, The Folly of Anti-Scalping Laws, 15
CATO J. 65, 75 (1995). Happel and Jennings cite Bruce Springsteen's attempt to ensure that only
true fans attended his concert by selling tickets only at the show and then requiring purchasers to
immediately enter the arena. Id.
182. Cf.id. at 70 (discussing the market restraints that are imposed on ticket pricing).
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375/1.5 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-27 (West 2001 &
Supp. 2009).
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policy. 185 But other states have constructed relatively high barriers.
Illinois, for example, requires that a ticket broker have $100,000 available for consumer protection claims. 186 In a competitive market, barriers to entry hinder the ability of new competitors to enter and
187
compete in the market.
Barriers to entry alone do not necessarily create a market problem
because "many markets have at least some impediments that make it
more difficult for a firm to enter the market."' 88 But when entry barriers become substantial enough, they "can retard, diminish, or entirely prevent the market's usual mechanism for checking market
power: the attraction and arrival of new competitors."'1 89 This Comment proposes that a $100,000 entry fee represents more than a natural barrier created by the market. Instead, it is a significant hurdle
that will effectively keep many potential sellers out of the secondary
ticket market. This reduction in firms and parties who participate in
the resale of tickets reduces the level of competition that incumbents
face in the secondary ticket market. 190 Without this competition,
prices will tend to increase because a reduction in competition generally leads to increased prices. If more firms could easily enter the secondary ticket market, greater competition would lead to lower
prices. 191 Thus, it seems that statutorily imposed barriers to entry
could potentially create higher prices for consumers in the secondary
ticket market than if the market was simply unregulated. Plainly, antiticket scalping statutes are not furthering their goal of maintaining
lower prices, and in fact, seem to be having the opposite effect.
3.

Benefits of an Open Market on Ticket Prices

When demand decreases, an unregulated secondary ticket market
would more effectively foster the intended goals of the regulation.
Just as an open market could lead to prices above face value when
demand increases, an open market could also lead to prices below
face value when demand dips. But some anti-ticket scalping statutes
prohibit the resale of tickets at below face value, and in fact, individu185. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-27 (West 2001 & Supp. 2009).
186. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375/1.5(b)(1)(F) (2008).
187. See Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., Competition and Barriers to Entry, POL'Y
BRIEF, Jan. 16, 2007, http://www.oecd.org (search "Competition and Barriers to Entry" in the
"Search Exact Match" field; then follow the first hyperlink returned by the search).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. An entry barrier "has the effect of reducing or limiting competition." Id.
191. See id.
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als have been arrested for attempting to do so.1 92 This undermines
any goal of keeping ticket prices down. It can be argued that secondary ticket market prices that are below primary market prices are
detrimental because they will divert sales from the promoter. Instead
of purchasing tickets in the primary market, consumers will turn to the
secondary market for virtually the same ticket at a lower price. This
argument should be rejected because many of these statutes are in
place to protect consumer welfare; 193 yet, paradoxically, many of these
statutes prohibit the resale of tickets at below face value. This effectively prevents consumers from purchasing tickets at the lowest possible value, a result that ultimately harms consumer welfare.
IV.

IMPACT

It is clear that modern trends in ticket scalping and market economics have undercut most, if not all, of the purposes behind regulating
ticket scalping. This Part first describes and critiques the proposed
federal legislation' 94 that is aimed at fixing the deficiencies of state
statutes and better regulating the trend of sellers who use the Internet
to access the secondary ticket market. 195 This Part concludes by analyzing the effects of an unregulated secondary ticket market and proposing what can be done to address the problems that would exist in
1 96
such a market.
A.

Proposed Federal Legislation

Federal anti-ticket scalping legislation was proposed for the first
197
time in 1998 by U.S. Representative Gary Ackerman of New York.
The legislation did not pass, 198 but Daniel J. Glantz-an author who
was supportive of federal anti-ticket scalping legislation-used Ackerman's plan to construct five provisions that any future federal legislation should contain. 199 First, the proposed legislation would contain a
192. See Hammer, supra note 43, at D1, D3.
193. See Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 198; Rabe, supra note 63, at 61.
194. See infra notes 197-207 and accompanying text.
195. Glantz, supra note 144, at 298-99; see also Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 218 (citing a New
Jersey case study that declares that the problem of ticket scalping is "a result of the absence of
federal legislation in this area").
196. See infra notes 225-231 and accompanying text.
197. Glantz, supra note 144, at 297-98. Ackerman is not alone in suggesting that greater
legislation is the answer to the ticket scalping problem. See Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 218.
198. Glantz, supra note 144, at 298. The proposed Ticket Scalping Reduction Act of 1998
would have imposed fines or a maximum of two years imprisonment on those who scalp five or
more tickets at one time, defining "scalp" as a markup of more than $5 or 10% above face value.
H.R. 3951, 105th Cong. (1998).
199. Id. at 299-304.
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"licensing requirement" that would force sellers to be licensed and to
pay annual fees and taxes.2 00 Further, it would force sellers to include
a licensing number with any tickets that they offer to sell, whether in a
face-to-face or Internet transaction. 20 1 The second provision is a "record keeping requirement" that would force secondary market sellers
to keep records of their sales in an effort to improve identification and
reporting methods of ticket resales. 2 02 The third provision is really a
group of "public interest provisions" that would limit the number of
tickets that each licensee could resell in order to "open up the marketplace to more individuals, while making the price of tickets better reflect their natural ticket price level where supply meets demand. 2' 03
While limiting the total number of tickets one individual can resell,
the "public interest provisions" would also increase the maximum
price a seller can charge in the secondary ticket market.20 4 Fourth,
any proposed legislation, according to Glantz, should have a section of
provisions set up to reduce nuisance. This includes a refund policy
that allows ticket holders to sell back their tickets to the promoter for
events that they cannot attend, and it would also contain a provision
that designates a certain areas around the venue as scalping areas. 205
The fifth and final section of any proposed federal legislation would
establish enforcement and authority regulations. This provision
would grant "the SEC or a similar organization" the authority to supervise and enforce the ticket scalping restrictions, including the responsibility of employing security for venues in order to control faceto-face sales.20 6 The cost of such enforcement would be covered by
the registration fees and taxes that are required by the other sections
20 7
of the proposed legislation.
B.

Is Federal Legislation the Answer?

Glantz acknowledges that the secondary ticket market-as currently structured under the various state laws-favors venue operators
200. Id. at 299-300.
201. Id. at 300.
202. Id. at 302. This provision makes exceptions for tickets sold at charity auctions and by
non-profit organizations, for group sales, and for sales on websites when the tickets are reserved
and then auctioned off to the high bidder. Id.
203. Id. at 301-02.
204. Id. at 301. Glantz does not explicitly identify what pre-existing "maximum price" he is
referring to, but it can be inferred that he is referring to the maximum prices imposed by the
already-existing state statutes that cap the price at which a ticket can be resold. See id. at 302
n.251.
205. Id. at 303.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 304.
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and owners at the disadvantage of consumers. 20 8 His provisions do
not aim to reduce or eliminate ticket scalping. Instead, their main
goal is to create a "natural and fair secondary market" by maximizing
the number of people who can participate in the secondary ticket market, which would ideally eliminate the advantage that promoters hold

over consumers in the secondary market. 20 9 But in analyzing the five
provisions, it is clear that all five are flawed.
1.

The Licensing Requirements and Record-Keeping Provisions

The first two provisions-the licensing requirement and recordkeeping requirement-are faulty for several reasons. First, the provisions would inhibit, rather than promote, a maximum amount of consumers from participating in the secondary ticket market. Common
sense dictates that some ticket holders will simply not go to the
trouble of recording ticket sales and becoming properly licensed,
which includes paying fees, in order to resell their tickets. As a result,

these consumers will remain precluded from the market, and the provisions would fail in its goal of eliminating the advantage that promot-

ers hold over consumers in the secondary market.
It is undisputed that a legitimate risk of deceit exists in the resale of

tickets, including the sale of counterfeit and misrepresented tickets.
And at first glance, it seems that licensing and record-keeping provisions could counteract this risk. But the growth of the Internet as a
medium for ticket resale has decreased this risk and mooted the need

for such provisions. Leading resale websites StubHub and eBay contain consumer protection provisions that allow ticket purchasers to
210
take action against sellers when they feel a sale has been fraudulent.

Other ticket websites have similar provisions. 21 ' The wide availability
208. Id. at 305.
209. Id.
210. See StubHub, StubHub FanProtect Guarantee, http://www.stubhub.com/guarantee/&?
osid=home-about (last visited Feb. 27, 2009). Stubhub's guarantee assures buyers that their tickets will be authentic and offers a refund for any delivered tickets that are not comparable to or
better than the tickets that they ordered. The guarantee also promises to reimburse buyers for
tickets to events that are rescheduled or canceled. Id. eBay's Resolution Center provides buyers with a handful of outlets to resolve issues, including directly contacting the seller, reporting
the seller to eBay's Trust and Safety team, and contacting PayPal-the method of payment often
used in eBay transactions. eBay, eBay Resolution Center, http://www.resolutioncenter.ebay.
com (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
211. See TicketsNow, TicketsNow 100% Unconditional Guarantee, http://www.ticketsnow.
com/Guarantee.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2009) (promising a refund for tickets that are not authentic). TicketExchange, the online service used by many professional sports teams to resell
tickets, offers buyers and sellers a customer service page through which they can lodge complaints. See Ticketmaster, Sports TicketExchange by Ticketmaster, http://teamexchange.ticket
master.comlhtml/tmthome.htmI?l (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
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of consumer protections for online sales means that the bulk of the
deceit concern rests with face-to-face sales. But deceit could potentially be an issue in only a small class of sales because of the shift in
the secondary market away from face-to-face sales and toward Internet sales. 212 It is illogical to demand that all sellers in the secondary
ticket market follow licensing and record keeping requirements-including some sellers who will presumably choose to stay out of the
market rather than follow the requirements-in order to protect a
small group of buyers in the secondary ticket market. Thus, both the
burden imposed by these two provisions and their probable effect of
reducing the number of sellers in the secondary ticket market outweighs the harm that the provisions purport to eliminate.
2.

The Quantity and Price Control Provision

In an attempt to shift secondary ticket prices to a more "natural"
spot where supply meets demand, the third provision places a ceiling
on both the price and number of tickets that an individual can resell. 213 But both aspects of this provision would fail to achieve this
"natural" supply and demand equilibrium. By capping the number of
tickets that each individual can resell, the provision potentially puts an
artificial limitation on supply-if someone has more tickets than he
can legally resell, these tickets cannot enter the resale market. This
reduction of supply is made more drastic when combined with the licensing and record-keeping provision, both of which would keep some
potential resellers out of the secondary market. This would not lead
to a "natural" price that reflects a perfect balance between supply and
demand. Instead, it would lead to higher-than-natural prices for
events with high demand because supply would equal demand only
after ticket prices increase. 2 14 The end result would be an intense bidding war in which those who highly demand the tickets would compete for the scarcely available tickets. One complaint about the
current secondary ticket market is that access to events is limited to
only those consumers who are willing to pay high prices on the secon212. See Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 198; Glantz, supra note 144, at 286-87.
213. Glantz, supra note 144, at 301-02.
214. See, e.g., Joseph Whelan & Kamil Msefer, Economic Supply and Demand, MIT Systems
Dynamic in Education Project, Jan. 14, 1996, availableat http://sysdyn.clexchange.orglsdep/Road
maps/RM6/D-4388.pdf. The authors use the example of clothing to illustrate the point. When
desired inventory (demand) exceeds inventory (supply), the price will rise. Id. at 9-11. Similarly, when desired tickets (demand) exceed available tickets (supply), the price will rise. The
difference is that with clothing a seller can increase supply to match demand, thus bringing the
price back down. The same cannot be done for tickets.
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dary market, harming those consumers who cannot afford the tickets. 215 A quantity sold provision would only intensify this problem.
The maximum price prong of this provision is faulty for similar reasons. The aim of this provision is also to achieve some "natural ticket
price level. '2 16 Generally, a natural price is one controlled by supply
and demand, where a shift in supply or demand of a good leads to a
price shift for that good.2 17 When demand in a natural market elevates, price increases. 2 18 Capping secondary market prices will create
an unnatural price whenever demand drives the price above the allowable price ceiling because that ceiling will make it impossible to sell
the ticket at the price that reflects the increased demand. This problem is compounded when the price provision is analyzed in unison
with the quantity provision. Just as increased demand allows a seller
to raise price, so can a decrease in supply. 21 9 Therefore, a provision
controlling the quantity of tickets available will create a market force
that will raise prices, which is contrary to its complementary maximum
price provision that sets a ceiling on the price of ticket resale. This
contradiction created by the two parts of this third provision illustrates why the provision fails.
3.

The Sell-back Provision

The sell-back provision attempts to cure some of the problems with
the first provision by exempting ticket holders from the license requirement when they are selling their tickets back to the venue. 220
The problem with this provision is that it would require vendors to
make sell-back an available outlet to tickets holders, as opposed to a
buy-back option that vendors can invoke. Before analyzing the assortment of issues raised by this provision, it is necessary to fill in a
key gap in this provision. It is assumed that the sell-back option operates as a "refund policy," 221 such that it can be inferred that the
buyback price is meant to be equal to the original purchase price. Operating under this assumption, a sell-back provision could be crippling
to a promoter. Forcing venue operators to buy back tickets from consumers who are unable to attend an event would mean that they must
215. See Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 198-99.
216. Glantz, supra note 144, at 302.
217. See Baumol & Blinder, supra note 176.
218. See Whelan & Msefer, supra note 214.
219. See id. The previous analysis that involved clothing illustrated that when demand exceeds supply, price will rise. In that scenario, an increase in demand caused demand to exceed
supply. But a reduction in supply can have the same effect.
220. See Glantz, supra note 144, at 303.
221. Id.
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return already-realized revenue and quickly find new consumers to
purchase the tickets. Anti-ticket scalping statutes are in place, at least
in part, to protect promoters. 222 Part of this protection includes
preventing scalpers from profiting from the resale of tickets, even
though the promoters profit from the initial sale. If ticket scalping is
prohibited in order to prevent others from realizing small profits at
the expense of promoters, then it is irrational for federal legislation to
completely strip promoters of all profits on a ticket sale. Further, a
refund policy would leave promoters with an allotment of tickets that
they would need to resell. Promoters often sell tickets well in advance
of an event to avoid the risk that a large amount of tickets will go
unsold. Federal legislation that gives consumers the power to return
tickets strips the promoters of this early-sale protection.
The sell-back provision is equally harmful to consumers. As the
previous analysis notes, promoters would lack an incentive to sell tickets in advance of events if they were forced to offer ticket refunds. As
a result, it is reasonable to think that some promoters may then sell
tickets only immediately prior to events, creating a nuisance and burden on consumers who wish to attend the event. To ensure a ticket,
consumers will line up well in advance of the event, maybe even days
ahead of time if demand is great enough. Current anti-ticket scalping
statutes, however, are aimed at protecting consumers from physical
nuisances and disturbances. 22 3 The high probability that a sell-back
policy could lead to nuisances for every popular event illustrates why
the policy is unattractive.
In an unregulated market, promoters would be allowed to keep
their profits and would not run the risk of being stuck with returned
tickets; sellers would be able to seek "refunds"-albeit not always a
full refund-from a wide pool of potential buyers; and potential disturbances caused by promoters delaying the sale of tickets are
avoided.
4.

The Enforcement Provision

Because the other provisions are unnecessary and counterproductive, a provision establishing enforcement authority and enacting strict
penalties for violations is also unnecessary. It is also questionable
whether licensing fees and taxes would be sufficient to fund a federal
body that is capable of enforcing the legislation. Several states cur222. See Criscuolo, supra note 5, at 196-98.
223. See id. at 198.
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rently charge licensing and other fees, 2 2 4 but they have not been able
to fully enforce their statutes. Even if enforcement was well-funded
and organized, it would be difficult to track and prosecute many of the
secondary market sales because they are sales that occur on the Internet and not between two people who are outside of a facility. Finally, the prevalence of primary ticket sellers in the secondary ticket
market means that the enforcement organization would be faced with
two options: selectively enforce the federal legislation by prosecuting
individual resellers but not teams, or prosecute individuals resellers
and those teams involved in the secondary ticket market. Both options would come with their problems, although those problems are
not explored by this Comment.
C. An Unregulated Market: Burden on the Promoter
Instead of the Legislator
The purposes and goals of the current anti-ticket scalping legislation
are not being met and the statutes are thus both ineffective and unnecessary. Beyond acknowledging the kinks in the current legislation,
it is also important to understand the benefits that an unregulated secondary ticket market can provide, both to the promoters and consumers. An unregulated market would allow promoters to become even
more involved in the secondary ticket market. Even with regulation,
primary ticket sellers have been leaking into the secondary ticket market. The result is that primary ticket sellers enjoy increased profits
made on secondary ticket sales, thereby reducing the profits of other
secondary ticket sellers. The elimination of regulation would continue
to support this trend. Further, consumers can also benefit from an
unregulated market. As previously discussed, a secondary ticket market can sometimes allow consumers to purchase tickets at prices below face value. An unregulated market, therefore, can offer benefits
to promoters and consumers-benefits the statutes attempt to offer
but do not deliver.
This is not to say that an unregulated secondary ticket market is an
ideal market. Most notably, while offering below face value prices in
some instances, an unregulated market can also create high prices for
events with especially high demand. The consequence of this is the
creation of an elite class of consumers who can afford the high prices,
thereby minimizing the number of people that can attend popular
sporting events and concerts. While this might be ideal under market
224. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375/1.5 (2008) (requiring ticket brokers to pay an annual
registration fee of $100); see also ALA. CODE § 40-12-167 (2005) (requiring any person who sells
a ticket at a price above face value to pay a $100 license tax).
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economics, most fans would agree that it is not ideal. Admittedly,
strict legislation, if combined with firm enforcement, would eliminate
the elite class of buyers on the secondary market by prohibiting the
resale of tickets at exorbitant prices. But the negatives that accompany such legislation weigh against its implementation, especially
when combined with the positives of an open market. Even absent
the negatives of the legislation and positives of an open market, the
legislation simply struggles to be effective at what it aims to do.
Therefore, an unregulated ticket market-although not perfect-is
the superior option when compared to heavy regulation. Consequently, any action taken in the ticket market should keep the secondary ticket market free of legislation while also minimizing the
problems that could arise in an unregulated market.
The best way to achieve a desirable secondary ticket market is by
giving promoters the burden of taking action. One proposed solution
is for promoters to delay selling tickets until closer to the event date.
Currently, it is common for tickets to go on sale long before events are
scheduled to occur. 22 5 By making tickets available only a day or two
ahead of time, the promoter would be creating a smaller window in
which tickets can be scalped. This would also allow a promoter to
more accurately price tickets, because price is tied to demand, and the
promoter can better ascertain demand for an event that is scheduled
to occur in a few days as compared to an event that is scheduled to
occur in months. By pricing tickets more accurately, the promoter can
fend off scalpers who are able to sell tickets on the secondary market
when their face value is below their market value.
This solution, while able to reduce the occurrence of ticket scalping,
is imperfect. First, as mentioned previously, selling tickets the day of
the event creates congestion and nuisance issues. Second, promoters
will argue that they are taking a significant risk by waiting until the
event day to sell tickets. The current practice of selling tickets ahead
of time allows promoters to hedge against lost interest as the date
nears. But by hedging that risk, promoters are creating a larger window in which scalping can occur. Therefore, the burden should be on
promoters to find an appropriate balance between selling tickets early
enough to avoid reduced sales when demand decreases and selling
tickets late enough that the opportunity to scalp is minimized.
225. This is the case for a number of reasons: (1) it avoids the congestion that would occur if
tickets were sold only on the day of the event; (2) it makes tickets available to a larger consumer
base; and (3) it allows the promoters to sell more tickets than they would sell if tickets are sold
only on the day of an event and if the event becomes unpopular.
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Another proposed solution is for promoters to use the secondary
market to more accurately predict and price their primary tickets.
This would be especially useful for promoters who sell tickets to recurring events, such as sporting events. By studying past prices on the
secondary market, promoters can better gauge the true market value
of tickets. 226 This would reduce the number of tickets being scalped
because scalpers take advantage of a difference in market price and
ticket price-when there is high demand for an event, scalpers are
able to sell the ticket in excess of its face value. But if promoters were
to increase primary ticket prices in response to a strong secondary
market, there would be no price discrepancy for scalpers to exploit.
Like the first proposed solution, this one also puts the burden on the
promoter.
Presumably, promoters will fear that increasing primary ticket
prices will cause a reduction in primary ticket sales. But this should
not be the case. Instead, setting primary prices equal to secondary
prices would just create a shift in who sells the tickets, not in how
many people buy tickets. A consumer willing to pay a scalper $25 for
a ticket that was originally priced at $15 should be just as willing to
pay $25 to the promoter for the same ticket.
Although this solution could reduce ticket scalping, it also has its
flaws. An increase in primary ticket prices does nothing to eliminate
the elite class of ticket buyers that would exist in an unregulated market. In an unregulated market, the "average fan" can purchase primary tickets at face value, while the elite class dominates the
secondary market for high-demand events. In a scenario where primary prices match secondary prices, the elite class would take over
the primary ticket market as well. This is an unenviable scenario for
many promoters who prefer a mix of fans. Moreover, setting price
based on the secondary market involves some risk that a promoter has
the ability to accurately read the secondary market and to price
accordingly.
A third proposed solution-often referred to as "scaling the
house" 227-is a form of variable pricing that is tied to consumer demand. In one form of variable pricing, promoters charge higher prices
for the especially popular games, such as night games, weekend
games, or late-season games, and lower prices for less popular games,
such as a weekday games or afternoon games. 228 In the other form of
226.
Lewis,
227.
228.

This practice has already been adopted by at least one professional sports team. See
supra note 116.
Happel & Jennings, supra note 181, at 75; Yang, supra note 4, at 123.
Yang, supra note 4, at 123.
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variable pricing, promoters charge a range of prices for tickets to the
same event, depending on the location of the seat. 22 9 In either form,
promoters make pricing decisions based on their anticipation of consumer demand. The result is a pricing system that alleviates several
problems that might develop in the unregulated market. First, such a
system reduces ticket scalping because, like the preceding solution,
tickets for games with high demand will have a face value more accurately tied to market value. Therefore, the scalper's ability to exploit
the gap between face value and market price is reduced. And unlike
the previous solution, this solution will not polarize the fan base because variable pricing ensures that some tickets-both in "bad" locations and to "bad" games-will be available at reasonable prices,
although tickets for the "good" seats and to "good" games will be
available only to the elite.230 However, the success of a variable pricing model also depends on the promoter having sufficient information
to price tickets in accordance with demand. 23 '
V.

CONCLUSION

Millions of people have used a website to purchase tickets to an
event. This is just part of the drastic evolution that the primary and
secondary ticket markets have undergone in recent years. The rise of
the Internet offers ticket holders a vast universe to resell tickets and
allows primary ticket sellers the ability to enter the secondary ticket
market. The secondary ticket market has also led to price increases in
the primary ticket market. 232 When anti-ticket scalping legislation
was passed in many states, these shifts in the primary and secondary
ticket markets had yet to occur, and it was unforeseen how the developments would render the statutes moot. These statutes, aimed in
part at protecting promoters from ticket scalping, lose their meaning
when promoters are active participants in the scalping market. Likewise, these statutes, aimed in part at protecting consumers from nuisance, were rendered virtually meaningless when the ticket scalping
market shifted away from face-to-face sales and toward Internet sales.
Finally, these statutes, aimed in part at protecting consumers from
paying high ticket prices, fail to consider that artificially controlling
prices in the ticket market prevents consumers from receiving reasonable ticket prices, sometimes prices below face value, when the natural market calls for it.
229.
230.
231.
232.

See Happel & Jennings, supra note 181, at 75.
See id.
Id.
See Rohan & Park, supra note 115, at Al; Lewis, supra note 116.
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This is not to say that an unregulated market is perfect, but it does
mean that an unregulated market is preferred to a statutorily-controlled market. The problems that would exist in an unregulated market-namely, the potential for higher prices and the development of
an elite fan base-are not so great that federal legislation should be
called on to eliminate these problems and in the process eliminate the
positives that an unregulated market provides. Instead, promoters
should bear the burden of enacting creative pricing models that let the
unregulated market flourish while minimizing the leftover problems
of such a market.
Steven C. Highfield*

* J.D. candidate, 2010, DePaul University College of Law; Bachelor of Arts in Journalism,
2007, Michigan State University. I would like to thank the members of the DePaul Law Review
Editorial Board for their time and efforts spent on this Comment throughout the editing process.
I would also like to thank Professor Michael Jacobs for his valuable comments on an early draft
of this Comment.

